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Expanding Enterprise: Geographical
Curbs on Mergers
G. E. Hale*
Rosemary D. Hale*
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, decisions of the Supreme Court have
breathed new life into the merger provisions of the antitrust
laws. Some practitioners might say they have made Section 7 of
the Clayton Act into a dragon with a tongue of flame. Such
attorneys envisage all capital transactions as in danger of in-
cineration and fear that the economy may be slowed by such a
restrictive interpretation of antimerger legislation.1
In part, the decisions have merely applied more stringent
rules to acquisitions traditionally vulnerable to antitrust attack.
Under earlier cases, for example, a merger could stand unless
it was shown that it might substantially lessen competition.2
Recently, however, the Court adopted the standard that a trans-
action may be voided where the only conceivable injury is to
potential competition.3 Since potential competition is at best a
nebulous concept, the reach of antimerger litigation has vastly
increased.4
New interpretations have also brought within the purview of
Section 7 mergers once believed beyond its scope. For example,
lawyers believed that the prohibitions of Section 7 extended
only to transactions between competing firms. The concept was
that only such a "horizontal" arrangement could have the requi-
site adverse effect upon competition. However, in United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,5 it was held that even a
"vertical" merger, such as the acquisition of a customer by a
manufacturer, might fall within the statutory prohibitions. Thus
the courts may affect the shape of business enterprise, restricting
its growth in one or more directions.
* Member, Illinois Bar.
** Lecturer in Economics, Lake Forest College.
1. E.g., Berghoff, The Size Barrier in Merger Law, 27 Omo ST. L.J.
76 (1966).
2. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964).
4. See Hale & Hale, Potential Competition under Section 7: The
Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 171.
5. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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One such direction may be characterized as "dispersion,"
meaning the acquisition of a similar company operating in a
different geographic area. Sometimes termed a market exten-
sion merger or territorial integration, 6 the prime characteristic of
dispersion is an increase in the territory served by the acquiring
firm. This article examines the extent to which such a merger
is subject to antitrust prohibition.
I. "DISPERSION" DEFINED
A merger in the nature of geographic dispersion describes
the acquisition of a firm carrying on a similar business in a dif-
ferent area. For example, it has been a familiar phenomenon
in the dairy industry. Spreading nationwide, firms such as Na-
tional Dairy Products,7 Foremost, and Borden" have built or
bought milk processing facilities in territories not previously
penetrated by them. Such mergers are by no means confined
to the dairy business as similar acquisitions have occurred fre-
quently in the refining of petroleum.9
Public thinking concerning such mergers has been reflected,
in part, by legislation against branch banking and chain re-
tailing.10 Anti-chain store sentiment, particularly bitter during
the depression, was remarkably similar in character to earlier
6. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF CoIPErmON: A STUDY OF THE EVOLU-
TION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 456 (1936).
7. NATIONAL DAIRY PRODUCTS CORPORATION, 1949 ANNUAL REPORT
6 (Mar. 2, 1950); PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GRowTH OF THE FIRM 119
(1959).
8. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Corporate Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1957); Stigler, Monop-
oly and Oligopoly by Merger, in READnGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 69, 77 (Heflebower & Stocking ed. 1958).
9. DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PE-
TROLEUM INDUSTRY 348 (1959).
Among other industries recently reported to have indulged in such
mergers are: prefabricated houses, steel, department stores, newspapers,
drug, and household products distribution. See, e.g., Burck, Anmco:
Precocious at Sixty, Fortune, Nov. 1959, pp. 129, 230; Rieser, Standard's
Qverstuffed Package, Fortune, Sept. 1960, p. 152; Wise, The Looting of
H. L. Green, Fortune, March 1960, pp. 142, 244; Wall Street Journal, Oct.
18, 1962, p. 7, col. 4; Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1962, p. 5, col. 1.
In recent years, acquisition of foreign firms has been a popular
means of geographic dispersion. See, e.g., Lincoln, How Reynolds
Brought, Off Its British Coup, Fortune, June 1959, pp. 112, 240; Wall
Street Journal, August 16, 1962, p. 7, col. 3.
10. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
Antitrust prosecution has also been employed against general retailing.
United States v. New York Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 51:857
EXPANDING ENTERPRISE
campaigns against mail order houses and department stores."
Recently, public discussion has again tended to focus on the
phenomenon in particular industries.' 2
Generally, a merger in the nature of geographic dispersion is
noncompetitive in nature. 3 Start with the assumption that A
company sells no milk in Wichita. If A then buys a dairy there,
the acquisition is noncompetitive with the rest of A's business,
apart from potential competition. Therefore, such a merger is
closely akin to a merger in the nature of diversification, and
many of the same considerations are applicable. 4
II. LEGAL LIMITATIONS UPON DISPERSION
Industrywide curbs upon geographic dispersion, whether by
merger or otherwise, have been attempted by many state legis-
latures. For example, some states have levied taxes specifically
designed to handicap chain retailing.15 Similarly, branch bank-
ing has been prohibited by law in at least one-third of the states
and limited in others.16 On the federal level this attitude is
manifested in the Public Utility Holding Company Act,' 7 which
reduces the scale of electric and gas suppliers. In contrast, under
the commerce clause and other constitutional provisions, the
courts have invalidated local legislation of a protectionist char-
11. E ETM & JEUCK, CATALOGUES AND COUNTERS, ch. 10 (1950);
Gould, Legislative Intervention in the Conflict Between Orthodox and
Direct-Selling Distribution Channels, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 318, 324
(1941); Nystrom, Retail Trade, 13 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 346, 349 (1934). Ac-
cording to Gould local merchants frequently organized bonfires of mail
order catalogues and indulged in other picturesque practices to limit
competition.
12. For example, dairying has been the target of widespread resent-
ment, expressed before congressional committees and elsewhere.
13. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv.
27, 28 (1949).
14. Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Proctor
& Gamble Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders, Stipulations)
15245, at 20256; id. 15773, at 20582 (1963), order set aside sub nom.,
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
15. See Collins, Anti-Chain Store Legislation, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 198,
206-12 (1939); Feldman, Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and Its
Minimization, 8 LAw & CONTEP. PRoB. 334, 334-39 (1941). Cf. Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 533 (1933).
16. See, e.g., Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 13-14, 251 Pac. 784,
788 (1927); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 16%, § 106 (1965). Restrictive legislation
has driven insurance companies from several states in the past. See
WILLiAMSON & SMALLEY, NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LiFE 74 (1957).
17. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 15
U.S.C. § 79 (1964); cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 197 (1943).
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acter. Burdensome inspection fees have been held unlawful, and
regulation ostensibly designed to protect public health has not
withstood judicial scrutiny when actually employed to protect
local producers at the expense of interstate commerce.'8
Traditionally, business' attempts to enlarge the geographic
scope of its activity through mergers have been held lawful. By
definition the merging parties are not competitors and, as ex-
pressly stated in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,' 9 "no di-
rection has appeared of a public policy that forbids, per se, an
expansion of facilities of an existing company to meet the needs
of new markets of a community .... -20 More particularly,
those cases holding it necessary to delimit a geographic market
in determining the application of the antimerger laws indicate
that an acquisition in the nature of geographic dispersion is
lawful.21 Finally, it should be noted that in the dissolution of
firms violating the Sherman Act with respect to monopolization,
the courts intentionally spread out the factories of the successor
units in order to assure the existence of competition at all
locations. 22
Such was the state of the law when, in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States,23 the Court hinted that a merger in the nature
of dispersion might not only substantially lessen competition
but could be found unlawful as such.24  In Brown Shoe the
Court spoke disapprovingly of the alleged advantages enjoyed by
a chain of stores over independent retailers. In United States v.
18. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951);
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1940); Hale v. Bimco Trad-
ing Co., 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939); Walgreen Co. v. Lenane, 363 III. 628,
2 N.E.2d 894 (1936); cf. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
19. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
20. Id. at 526. See also United States v. National Homes Corp., 196
F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961); United States v. Philips Petroleum Co.,
5 CCH TRADE. REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 1 71872, at 83063 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 24, 1966).
21. E.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163,
168-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). See Bruner v. Citi-
zens' Bank, 134 Ky. 283, 120 S.W. 345 (1909). Even an initial decision
before the Federal Trade Commission took the same position. National
Tea Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders, Stipulations)
% 16376, at 21238 (1963); cf. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 (1966); Hale & Hale, Deliniating the Geographic Market: A Problem
in Merger Cases, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 538, 539-40 (1966).
22. Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monop-
olistic Size, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 615, 627 (1940).
23. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
24. See id. at 344. Cf. United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 202
F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1962), rev'd and remanded, 371 U.S. 70 (1962),
re-adjudicated, 1963 Trade Cas. 77906 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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El Paso Natural Gas Co.,25 however, the Court relied upon the
concept of potential competition in order to find a merger into a
new geographic area invalid. It reasoned that the acquired firm
was a potential competitor in the acquiring firm's territory.2
6
The Court's rationale thus implied that, absent such potential
competition, a merger in the nature of dispersion would not be
reached by the law.
The Federal Trade Commission, however, has flatly held that
a merger in the nature of geographic dispersion infringes Section
7 of the Clayton Act.2 7 Further, since a recent judicial pro-
nouncement permits the application of the antimerger laws to ac-
quisitions in the nature of diversification,28 it is likly that simi-
lar results will soon be recorded with respect to dispersion.
Mention should also be made of several important Sherman
Act cases involving the operation of motion picture "circuits."
The operators of such chains have been held in violation of the
Sherman Act, because they bargain with film distributors as a
unit.2 9 Since some of the theaters involved were located in towns
25. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
26. Id. at 659-61.
27. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
It is respondent's position that national market share data
are without meaning since they do not depict changes that are
occurring in the relevant local markets. We do not agree that
such data are meaningless as, in our view, the national market
share data do provide one index of the industrial transforma-
tion occurring in this industry....
Id. at 1057.
It is obvious from our previous discussion of the competi-
tive situation existing in the dairy industry and the advantages
of diversification, that acquisitions by large firms in this indus-
try have implications for competition regardless of the fact that
they do not occur in markets in which the acquiring firms
already operate. It is equally clear from the legislative history
that Section 7, as amended, is intended to embrace all types of
acquisitions regardless of their designations....
Id. at 1083. Inland Container Corp., 10 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Com-
plaints, Orders, Stipulations) f 17012, at 22116 (1964); cf. Scott Paper
Co., 55 F.T.C. 2050, 2055 (1959). Several of the Trade Commission pro-
ceedings against the nationwide dairy firms have been settled by consent
orders. The Borden Co., 10 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 1 16869, at 21860 (1964); National Dairy Prods. Co., 9 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) f 16282, at 21110
(1963). In Borden, the defendant was required to divest itself of eight
units, and in both cases further acquisitions in the processing of milk
products were forbidden for a period of ten years. In view of the num-
ber of acquisitions, it cannot be said that the foregoing settlements are
drastic in character.
28. Cf. Howrey, Merger Problems Confronting the FTC, N.Y.S.B.A.,
ANTrIRuST LAW Symposium 41, 43, 45 (1955); Note, § 7 Is Applicable to
Bank Holding Companies, 67 HARv. L. REV. 529, 531 (1954).
29. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116
1967]
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so small that there was no local competitor, the motion picture
chains were deemed to enjoy monopoly power in those "closed"
towns. Their vice was using that power to bargain for films in
the competitive areas. While most chain retailers probably do
not enjoy quite as much market power as the theater chains in
the monopoly towns, it must be apparent that competitive condi-
tions will often vary widely through the geographic territory
served by any chain of retail establishments. It would appear
to follow that nearly all chain store operators violate the Sher-
man Act. Actually, litigation has not so indicated, and the thea-
ter cases remain largely unexploited by plaintiffs. Their ration-
ale, however, could readily be applied to defeat any merger in-
creasing the scope of a firm's operation.
III. THE RATIONALES OF PROHIBITING DISPERSION
To date, there has been so little litigation with respect to
mergers in the nature of geographic dispersion that it is difficult
to point out the grounds upon which they may be attacked. As
indicated above, proprietors of chain motion picture "circuits"
have been found guilty of restraining and monopolizing trade
under the Sherman Act because they bargained for all of their
theaters as a single package. Nothing in these opinions indicates
that the decisions rest upon injury to the theaters' patrons. In-
stead, any injury found was inflicted upon proprietors of com-
peting theaters. In United States 9). Griffith,30 the complaint
charged that the defendants' buying power resulted in exclusive
privileges-preemption in the selection of film and "clearances." 3' 1
In so holding, the Court concluded:
Anyone who owns and operates the single theatre in a town
... has a monopoly in the popular sense. But he usually
does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless he has ac-
quired or maintained his strategic position, or sought to ex-
pand his monopoly, or expanded it by means of those re-
straints of trade which are cognizable under § 1....
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town
commands the entrance for all films into that area. If he uses
that strategic position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city
where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly power
as a trade weapon against his competitors....
The consequence of such a use of monopoly power is that
films are licensed on a non-competitive basis in what would
otherwise be competitive situations .... If monopoly power
(1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 181 (1944).
30. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
31. Id. at 103.
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can be used to beget monopoly, the Act becomes a feeble
instrument indeed .... 32
Further, as the Court said in Brown Shoe:
[I]t is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects.
But one cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result .... 33
Not every dispersed firm will enjoy the position of the de-
fendant in the Griffith case with its "monopoly towns." How-
ever, it is highly unlikely that the degree of competition faced
by a firm will be equal in each area wherein it operates.
34 It
would therefore appear that any acquisition in the nature of dis-
persion could be attacked on Griffith's rationale. What degree
of monopoly the defendant need enjoy in order to call the anti-
merger laws into play is not revealed by the decisions however.
Presumably something more dramatic than a mere small differ-
ence in competitive conditions would be required.
The Federal Trade Commission, in attacking mergers in the
nature of diversification, has argued that such acquisitions enable
the defendant to achieve economies. The Commission thought
that the merged firm could expand into new areas at lower cost
than would be incurred if it built new facilities therein. It also
found injury to potential competition and economies in the abil-
ity of the combined enterprise to employ nationwide adver-
tising.3 5 Here again, there is no suggestion that consumers will
32. Id. at 106-08. See also United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173, 181 (1944).
33. 370 U.S. at 344.
34. See Beatrice Foods Co., 10 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations) f 16831, at 21810 (1964). In Foremost Dairies, Inc.,
60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), the Commission said:
As a result of their numerous mergers these large dairy
firms have become vast concerns operating across many mar-
kets and . . . meet one another as competitors in many of the
same markets.... [M]ost of the remaining firms in this in-
dustry are relatively small independent dairies operating in one
or very few markets. The relatively large size and geograph-
ically diversified character of these firms is of considerable
potential significance for the character of competition we may
expect among these firms. Their geographic diversification
adds a significant dimension to their behavioral opportunities.
Id. at 1059. In United States v. Philips Petroleum Co., 5 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 71872, at 83063 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1966), the
court found that Philips was not a potential customer in California be-
cause no pipeline ran there, hence it could not compete with local refin-
eries. Thus a preliminary injunction was denied.
35. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), though really
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be injured by higher prices; rather, the injury is to be inflicted
upon competitors whose costs are higher.
An allied suggestion is that the power of chain retailers to
set styles through uniform display of products in numerous
widely dispersed stores would constitute a competitive advan-
tage.36 Apparently the thought is that the retail establishments
offer opportunities for influencing public opinion when they are
sufficiently numerous, while a single store would lack the dis-
play facilities necessary to initiate such style changes.
Another rationale, again focusing on injury to competitors as
opposed to consumers, lies in fear of creating wealthy concerns
too powerful for localized competitors. Here again the Federal
Trade Commission has adopted the position that through such
acquisitions economic power can be achieved to outlast local con-
cerns and drive them from the field.
37
Turning from economic to sociological grounds, one finds fre-
quent complaints that the chain store, the branch bank, or the
absentee-owned factory destroy values inherent in small busi-
ness communities. To date, no such view appears to have been
voiced in a merger case. However, /fr. Justice Cardozo, dissent-
ing in a chain store tax case, expressed the fear that chain stores
will sap the fiber of civic virtue:
The business that keeps at home affects the social organism in
a diversification or product extension merger, was governed by much
the same considerations as geographic extension.
36. Cf. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1072 (1962). See gen-
erally Edwards, Geographic Price Formulas and the Concentration of
Economic Power, 37 GEo. L.J. 135, 136-37 (1949); Senate Select Commit-
tee on Small Business, Sixth Annual Report, S. REP. No. 1368, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 67 (1956). The foregoing idea can be found at least as early
as Benjamin, The Illinois Plan for the Prevention and Suppression of
Monopolies, 73 CENT. L.J. 131-32 (1911). Cf. Northwest Bancorporation
v. Board of Governors, 303 F.2d 832, 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1962) (bank
merger prohibited because only other bank in town also part of a chain).
Does this mean that the first chain is to be protected from the competi-
tion of the second?
37. National Tea Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 17463, at 22694
(1966); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1059 (1962). See also
Weiss, An Evaluation of Mergers in Six Industries, 47 PEv. EcoN. & STATS.
172, 178 (1965), where the author supports the position of the FTC as
follows:
[T]he development of national chains may facilitate gentle-
men's agreements. U.S. Steel's acquisition of a major western
plant and its construction of a major eastern plant certainly
enhanced its leadership qualities. With F.O.B. mill prices and
freight absorption, quasi-isolated plants might find periodic
changes in base prices attractive, but with U.S. Steel in every
major market, such independent local pricing decisions seem
less likely.
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ways that differ widely from those typical of a business that
goes out into the world. It affects the social organism, but it
also affects itself. With the lengthening of the chain there are
new fields to be exploited. .... 38
Other courts have voiced fears that chain store employees have
less interest in local affairs than nontransients. 39 The late Sena-
tor Kefauver claimed that levels of civic welfare were higher in
small local business communities than in big absentee business
communities.40 Some commentators have gone so far as to claim
that education and public health are better where chain stores
do not exist.41 In its extreme form the complaint against ab-
sentee ownership takes on a highly nostalgic and almost incredi-
ble character. For example, one enthusiastic observer attributed
family and community disintegration, unemployment, and war
to geographic dispersion of business.4
In view of the scarcity of judicial direction suggesting
which, if any, of the above rationales might be applied to this
38. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 581 (1933).
39. Thus, in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938), the
court wrote:
Great aggregations of wealth control much of the merchandising
field of today .... At the same time we still have with us the
independent merchants .... They have hitherto been consid-
ered as part of the "backbone" of every community, radiating
their influence throughout the length and breadth of the state
... upholding, the moral fibre of the communities, upon which,
in the long run, the existence of the commonwealth depends.
The legislature has the right, we think, to give them a fair
chance in the field of competition; to give them a chance to
remain a pillar of support, thus at the same time giving an
opportunity for the maintenance of individualism, still of im-
portance in our day, and which, except for such legislation,
might be entirely crushed.
Id. at 351, 84 P.2d at 774. Similar language appears in Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Kentucky Tax Comm'n, 278 Ky. 367, 373, 128 S.W.2d 581, 584
(1939); May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 45
N.W.2d 245 (1950); 1 PRES -ENT's RESEARCH CoMAIrnrrs ON SOCIL
TRENDS, RECENT SocIAL TRENDS 525 (1929). To somewhat the same effect
are the decisions in National Tea Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 17463,
at 22694 (1966), and Foremost Dairies, 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
40. Kefauver, The Supreme Court and Congress Versus Monopoly,
20 TENN. L. Rnv. 254, 255 (1948). Controversy continues to rage as to
whether any important change has been wrought in the economy by
reason of the existence of large corporations with a multitude of small
stockholders. See Peterson, Corporate Control and Capitalism, 79 Q.J.
EcoN. 1 (1965).
41. BUTTERS, LiNTNR & CARY, EFFECTS or TAXATION: CORPORATE
MERGERS 4, (1951); one writer has argued that the dispersed firm may
overshadow local government and thus attain broad political power.
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GovERNmENTAL
POLICY 107 (1949). Smaller War Plants Corporation, Small Business and
Civic Welfare, S. Doc. No. 135, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 18, 22 (1946).
42. BROWNELL, THE HumAN Comlm-uNY 62, 65, 293 (1950).
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
kind of merger, businesses considering such dispersion have no
adequate means of testing the legality of such ventures. So
sweeping are the above grounds, however, that it is difficult to
envisage an acquisition which could not be reached by at least
one of these rationales.43
IV. CRITIQUE OF DISPERSION
Inherent in several of the above listed arguments against ac-
quisitions leading to geographic dispersion is the complaint that
they may result in price discrimination. Such is the case with
the complaint that the combination permits operation at lower
cost and, hence, lower prices in selected places. It is similarly
true of the argument against the motion picture "circuits" be-
cause, so the theory goes, the combination of monopoly and com-
petitive areas permits discrimination against the latter. It must
be conceded that discrimination in the economic sense will al-
most inevitably flow from any merger in the nature of dispersion
just as it does from one in the nature of diversification. The
reason is simple: competitive forces vary from place to place
just as they do from product to product. In some territories
the dispersed firm will be able to secure a larger margin of
profits than in others. Accordingly, there will be discrimination.
Thus it has been concluded:
We can say more generally of a multi-plant or multi-
product firm: if its price differentials do not strictly follow its
cost differentials, then its price structure is a honeycomb of
discrimination. Furthermore, to the extent that the cost of the
respective commodities are unknowm because of accounting
difficulties, nondiscrimination is strictly an accident.44
In the motion picture "circuit" cases discussed above,45 the
fact of combination added nothing to the theater operator's pow-
er to raise admission prices. Presumably, to the extent he owned
theaters in areas enjoying but one such place of amusement, he
would have greater upward freedom of pricing than in territories
43. Several of the forgoing rationales would be equally applicable
to the acquisitions of foreign businesses.
44. Adelman, supra note 13, at 40-41. Professor Adelman went on
to say:
[M]ulti-product production has the effect of separating the cus-
tomers so that they can be charged varying prices not corre-
sponding fully to varying costs. Geographical price discrim-
ination rests on differences in location, and is completely anal-
ogous. "Meeting competition as you find it" is the rule in both
cases, and this is simply the other side of the same phenome-
non-price discrimination.
Id. at 41.
45. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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where patrons could choose among several rival establishments.
But so far as the patrons were concerned, the fact of combina-
tion would not affect admission prices, which would be controlled
by competitive conditions, relative costs, and the like. Whatever
may be wrong with the situation arises from the lack of competi-
tion in the single theater towns, presumably often resulting from
factors of indivisibility. Only one thesis48 appears to support
the theory that the motion picture exhibitor could add to his
market power by an acquisition in the nature of dispersion.47
Conversely, it is clear that such an acquisition may result in
cost savings to the combined firm. Indeed, the merger in ques-
tion would presumably never have been negotiated unless some
such spreading of overhead costs were envisaged. 48  Observers
have found that there are such savings in the operation of chain
stores in the grocery field. In numerous other industries simi-
lar cost reduction can be achieved through nationwide promo-
tion and distribution of goods.49  End to end consolidation of
46. See Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV.
62 (1960), in which the author attempts to show how a firm may benefit
from vertical integration and tied sales. His theory could, presumably,
be applied to the geographic enlargement of the enterprise. Economists
generally seem unimpressed by Burstein, as his thesis has not been ac-
cepted in later papers. E.g., Stigler, United States v. Loew's, Inc.: A
Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 152.
47. Another theory was advanced in Beatrice Foods Co., 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17244, at 22317 (1965). Although in part resting on
the theory that such a merger may raise barriers to entry (at 22337) and
that it builds a foundation for predatory price-cutting (at 22334), the
principal ground for holding the merger invalid under both § 7 of the
Clayton Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is found in
the concept of potential competition. The Commission reasoned that
Beatrice Foods Co., a nationwide dairy, was a potential competitor in
the areas which it invaded by merger. Hence the acquisitions impaired
that potential competition (at 22339). A somewhat similar view is ex-
pressed in Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1374 (1965).
48. Attacks upon mergers in the nature of dispersion almost neces-
sarily imply a sharing of costs which reduces total expense. Accord,
NATIONAL COIMMVISSION ON FOOD MARKETING, FOOD FROM FARMER TO CON-
SUMER 46 (1966), which said:
Dairy firms, whether national or regional, have acquired
primarily plants that process and distribute fluid milk or ice
cream. The aims are to raise profits by increasing efficiency
and sales, to counterbalance the power of chain stores, and to
spread risk over wider areas.
49. HOFFMAN, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES
14, (TNEC Monograph No. 35, 1940). In United States v. Third Nat'l
Bank in Nashville, 1964 Trade Cas. 79825 (M.D. Tenn. 1964), the court
went so far as to say that branch competition is the hallmark of modern
banking. Id. at 79828. Cf. Bain, Advantages of the Large Firm, 20 J.
MLKETING 336, 344 (1956).
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railroads has been urged as a means of avoiding duplication of
terminals and the like.50 Lower transport costs may be achieved
through geographic dispersion of factories and stores.51 As men-
tioned, several advertising benefits, mostly depending on the
existence of nationwide media, may be reaped by the geograph-
ically dispersed firm.52  For such reasons observers have
thought that the mass merchandising of grocers was harmless,
efficient, and nonmonopolistic. 53 One observer went so far as
to conclude:
The mail order house and the large retail chain represent the
first intelligent attack upon the wastes of distribution and the
first systematic attempt to bring economy into the processes of
marketing .... [B]igness itself is not of necessity a move into
monopoly.5 4
Not all the factors, however, work in favor of cost reduction.
In many instances, autonomous local management may prove
more efficient than distant control. Bitter experience taught
Paramount Pictures the diseconomies of centralized control of
more than 1,000 theaters.5 5 In other words, indivisibility at the
factory level works against dispersion of the plant into every
sales area.56 For such reasons local merchants, particularly when
organized into "voluntary" groups,5 have been able to compete
with chain stores successfully. Here technological changes may
prove of considerable importance."8
50. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14,
pt. 3, at 261 (1950).
51. See BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETiTION 256 (1936).
52. HOOVER, THE LOCATION OF EcoNoMIvc AcTiTY 56 (1948); STOCK-
ING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 73 (1951). An interest-
ing example in the automobile rental field is reported in Loehwing,
Drive-Ur-Self, 35 BAREON'S No. 36, p. 3 (Sept. 5, 1955). Note also that
identical appearance of numerous chain stores has competitive advan-
tages. See Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 98 (1935).
53. HOFrMAN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 157.
54. Abrahamson, The Automobile Tire-Forms of Marketing in
Combat, in PRICE & PRICE POLICIES 83, 115 (Hamilton ed. 1938).
55. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 27 (1960);
cf. Willis, Branch Banking, 2 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 679, 680 (1932).
56. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 41, at 114; HoovER, op. cit. supra
note 52, at 48; STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 52, at 72.
57. See BRUNNER & KOLB, RURAL SOCIAL TRENDS 150 (1933); Engle,
Chain Store Distribution vs. Independent Wholesaling, 14 J. MARMTING
241, 251 (1949); Oakes, Price Differences for Identical Items in Chain,
Voluntary Group, and Independent Grocery Stores, 14 J. MARKETING 434
(1949); See generally Phillips, An Evaluation of Large-Scale Retailing
With Emphasis on the Chain Store, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 348 (1941).
58. E.g., Hobby, Bottles or Cans, 34. BAaON's No. 42, p. 7 (Oct. 18,
1954).
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It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that whatever
economies may arise from a merger in the nature of dispersion
will require appreciation of the whole question of the econo-
mies of location. Producers have an incentive to locate near sup-
pliers as well as customers. Careful balancing of production
economies against transport costs is required. Perishability of
product may prove an important factor. Altogether, the calculus
of serving the consumer cheaply is complex, and many means
are employed to that end.59 Therefore, while a presumption of
cost reduction may properly be raised in any given merger, the
evidence may indicate the contrary.
If indeed dispersion does permit reduction of costs, it may
compel others similarly to extend the geographic limits of their
enterprises. As in the case of diversification, therefore, capital
requirements may be raised. To the extent that access to capital
is barred by lack of information or otherwise, mergers in the
nature of dispersion may thus increase barriers to entry.60 Note,
however, that entry may be made more difficult without mer-
gers because internal growth may effectively create dispersed
firms.
Probably the real objection to acquisitions leading to na-
tionwide sales is the wealth which such transactions often place
under unitary control.61 However, mere dispersion does not au-
tomatically guarantee the wealth of an acquiring firm. In some
lines of endeavor, capital requirements are small and even the
most dispersed and profitable firm will not necessarily be
wealthy. Profitability, of course, still remains the key to wealth;
the mere size of the enterprise is meaningless if it faces bank-
ruptcy.
With the foregoing qualifications it is nevertheless plain that
welding a series of similar independent stores, factories, or other
59. See Greenhut, Size of Markets Versus Transport Costs in Indus-
trial Location Surveys and Theory, 8 J. INDusTRTAL Ecox. 172 (1960); See
also Bowden & Cassady, Decentralization of Retail Trade in the Metro-
politan Market Area, 5 J. MARKETING 270, 274 (1941); 1 PREsiDENT's
COMWTTEE ON RECENT SocIAL TRENDS, RECENT SoCIAL TRENDS 457 (1929);
See generally HOOVER, op. cit. supra note 52, ch. 2. The method of effect-
ing sales may also be important. Door to door canvassing may elimi-
nate the need for retail establishments. See City of Orangeburg v.
Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936).
60. Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Committee,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 114 (1938); See also BECKMN & NOLEN,
THE CHAnN STORE PROBLEm 225 (1938).
61. But cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966),
indicating that § 2 of the Sherman Act can be called into play even if
the defendants have not achieved wealth.
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enterprises into a single unit will increase the resources cen-
tralized in a single corporate entity. Once resources have been
assembled they no doubt furnish an opportunity for price-cutting
or other predatory practices which can injure less well-endowed
competitors. The extent to which chain stores and similar firms
actually exercise those powers is difficult to appraise.62 It is
worth noting, however, that Section 2 of the Sherman Act bears
directly on such predatory practices. Consequently, the public is
not powerless in the face of such activity by the consolidated
enterprise.
The more substantial element in the complaint against
wealth and absentee control lies in the realm of sociology rather
than economics. Absentee ownership is not a new problem; it
has been with us for centuries.6" While some of the more ex-
travagant claims made for local control and ownership referred
to above are no doubt without foundation,64 the literature indi-
cates a sound basis for some degree of apprehension that mana-
gers of absentee-owned establishments are less socially useful
citizens than would otherwise be the case. 65 The fact that some
dispersed enterprises have taken steps to ameliorate the adverse
effects of absentee control suggests the reality of the problem.66
By the same token, those steps may have mitigated the adverse
effects in some reasonably sufficient measure.6 7  One writer
reached the following conclusions on the subject:
The answer to the charge that the chain's absentee owner-
ship is socially undesirable must be somewhat indefinite as we
have no exact test of just what is socially desirable. Yet it is
important to note that many chains are taking steps to build
themselves into community life.... [M]any chains are still
far from being as good "citizens" as is desirable, but we should
not overlook the fact that by no means are all independent
merchants the community-minded men they are sometimes
pictured.6 8
62. Phillips, supra note 57, at 354; cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea. Co. v.
Kentucky Tax Comm'n, 278 Ky. 367, 379, 128 S.W.2d 581, 587 (1939).
The "recoupment" theory was exposed as falacious long ago. Adelman,
supra note 13, at 46.
63. Knight, Absentee Ownership, 1 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 376-78 (1930).
64. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
65. Palmer, Economic and Social Aspects of Chain Stores, 2 U.
CiNc. J. Bus. 272, 279 (1929); Schulze, The Role of Economic Dominants
in Community Power Structure, 23 Am. Soc. REV. 3, 7 (1958).
66. Anon., Penney's, King of the Soft Goods, 42 Fortune, Sept. 1950,
pp. 101, 104; ILLINois BELL TELEPHONE Co., 1950 ANNuAL REPORT 25, 27
(March 10, 1951).
. 67. BRUmER & KOLB, RunAr. SociA TaRENms 150 (1933); NATIONAL
BiscunT Co., 1949 ANNUAL REPORT 14.
68. Phillips, supra note 57, at 355.
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The importance of the residual impact can probably never be
appraised. On the other hand, as Judge Learned Hand reminded
us, Congress was not necessarily actuated by economic motives
alone in enacting antitrust legislation. It is possible, he wrote,
because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of
small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those en-
gaged must accept the direction of the few.69
V. BENEFITS OF DISPERSION
Consonant with fears that competitors may be injured un-
less such mergers are curbed, it is possible that mergers de-
signed to widen the geographic scope of a firm's operation lead
to significant economies. To the extent that such is the case,
competition may be intensified.7 0 Examples of more vigorous
competitive conditions are found in many industries, including
petroleum refining. In one study, much of the competition
achieved through invasion of the previously separated geographic
markets of the old Standard Oil combination was attributed to
mergers and acquisitions. 1 One viewpoint, emphasizing the
69. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945). In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897), the following language appears with respect to monop-
olies in general:
It is in the power of the combination to raise it [prices], and
the result in any event is unfortunate for the country by de-
priving it of the services of a large number of small but inde-
pendent dealers who were familiar with the business and who
had spent their lives in it, and who supported themselves and
their families from the small profits realized therein .... [I]t
is not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes
should occur which result in transferring an independent busi-
nessman, the head of his establishment, small though it might
be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation. .. having no
voice in shaping the business policy of the company ....
Id. at 324.
70. See EMM=T & JEUCK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 168.
Unless we take full account of the notion of potential competition,
an acquisition in a geographic area new to the acquiring firm does not
reduce competition. As noted in the text, it may increase competition.
If enterprises were forbidden to expand geographically via the acquisi-
tion route, some would no doubt build new facilities in the new area.
Assuming that the managers of the enlarging firm are well informed
and rational, no waste of resources would result from such building.
Presumably, however, some waste would result from preventing the
realization of economies to be achieved by acquisition. In other words,
if a ban on dispersion is designed to protect existing firms, it will, like
a protective tariff, impose some costs upon consumers.
71. DE CHAzFAu & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 95. An example
appears in Jennings, Remarks at Annual Meeting, Socony-Vacuum Oil
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competitive contribution of the chain merchandiser, states:
Although ... mass distributors have attained great size
and although they handle a substantial fraction of the retail
trade, it cannot be said that they possess anything approaching
a monopoly....
Instead of monopolizing the retail trade, the mass distrib-
utor has made it more actively competitive .... 72
Another pointed to the beneficial effect thus realized in con-
cluding:
An imperfect market, containing not a single price, but a
spread of prices, can be exploited by a large buyer who can
be "all over the place" at any given moment and take the
better offers. The effect of such a buyer is to narrow the
range of prices, lower their average, and make for a single
price in the market.
Sellers who might otherwise receive higher prices because
of their customers' ignorance of lower prices elsewhere in the
market are forced to meet these lower prices .... It is not
difficult to understand sellers' and competitors' resentment at
such "demoralization." But it is difficult to see why anyone
concerned with the general welfare should share it.73
Moreover, the courts have repeatedly recognized the possibility
that monopolies may flourish in relatively small geographic re-
gions.74 Hence, to the extent that mergers in the nature of dis-
Company, April 26, 1945:
For several years we have had a substantial stock interest
in Gilmore Oil Company, which conducted a marketing business
and small refining operation on the Pacific Coast. Late in 1944
we acquired substantially all of the outstanding stock in the
Gilmore Company, and in March of this year these properties
were consolidated with those of the General Petroleum Corpo-
ration, our Pacific Coast subsidiary. This consolidation will
materially strengthen our position on the Pacific Coast through
providing a larger number of retail outlets all selling the com-
pany's branded products.
72. Wimcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AIMtERICAN INDUSTRY
56-57 (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1940); BUTTERS, LINTNER & CARY, Op.
cit. supra note 41, at 20; McNair, Monopolistic Competition in Retailing,
in CHAIN STORES AND LEGISLATION 245, 246 (Bloomfield ed. 1939); Palmer,
supra note 65, at 287; cf. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S.
1, 8 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
73. Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238, 247-48 (1949); cf. United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1966 TaDE CAS.) 1 71872, at
83063 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1966).
74. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 235 (1948); More v. Bennett, 140 Ili. 69, 29 N.E. 888 (1892);
Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop Ice & Storage Co., 172 La. 782, 135 So. 239
(1931). Many lessons are to be learned in this area from recent and
current European experience. See Spaak & Jaeger, The Rules of Com-
petition Within the European Common Market, 26 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 486, 486-87 (1961). See generally Thiesing, Rules Governing
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persion increase competition therein, they must be regarded as
beneficial. Further, if the acquisition is prompted by the attrac-
tion of higher profit margins in the acquired firm's territory, it
may serve to shift resources in that direction, since the acquiring
firm often has larger financial means. To the extent that such a
shift takes place, it will be socially desirable as bringing a needed
supply of capital more rapidly into the area.
Finally, as in the case of diversification, there is the problem
of growth. It is a familiar practice for the individual firm to
grow through acquisition of similar enterprises in other terri-
tories.75 One need only consider the example of penetration of
a foreign market to realize why such growth so often takes the
form of an acquisition as opposed to building new facilities. On
the other hand, examples can be cited of such growth achieved
without the benefit of existing facilities.76 It is not easy to
demonstrate a relationship between the growth of the firm and
the growth of the economy as a whole. 77 It is nevertheless
possible that restrictions on mergers in the nature of dispersion
could freeze the status quo in an undesirable manner.
CONCLUSION
A merger in the nature of dispersion is unlikely to result in
an impairment of competition. The only competition which can
be adversely affected is the potential competition of the acquir-
ing firm. If the merger is barred and the acquiring firm thus
kept out of a geographic market, it may remain a potential en-
trant. However, since it cannot enter except by building new
facilities, it may be a handicapped potential competitor. In any
event, taking full account of potential competition seems only
remotely possible. If the courts gave full play to that concept,
there would almost always be so much competition in any mar-
ket that no merger could work a substantial diminution thereof.
More importantly, it is entirely possible that a merger in the
nature of dispersion will actually increase competition in the
new territory. Beyond that it is likely, though far from certain,
Competition Within the European Regional Communities, 26 LAW &
CoNTEmp. PRoB. 464, 471, 473 (1961).
75. See ABBOTT LABORATORIES, 1949 ANNUAL REPORT 23. Rieser,
Consolidated Foods: All Over the Lot, Fortune, June 1960, pp. 139,
255. Cf. Weiss, supra note 37, at 178. But see WILiA1msoN & SmALLEY,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 59.
76. DE CHAZEAu & KAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 97.
77. Cf. McConnell & Peterson, Research and Development: Some
Evidence for Small Firms, 31 So. ECON. J. 356, 364 (1965).
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that such a merger will result in increased efficiency. If so,
consumers should benefit unless market imperfections or im-
purities prevent them from doing so. In that event, however,
the remedy lies in the removal of those impurities or imperfec-
tions.
Territorial extension mergers, like others, may result in the
creation of wealthy corporations. Firms with large financial
resources may engage in predatory practices. In the past, how-
ever, that possibility has not seemed sufficiently hazardous to
create barriers to mergers. For example, no limits are set upon
the growth of investment trusts (mutual funds). And if predatory
practices appear, present legislation is sufficient to cope with
them.
The solid objections to dispersion, by merger or otherwise,
are sociological in character. They are not thereby any less
worthy of consideration, although they are extremely difficult to
quantify. Our notions of the efficiency to be gained by a merger
are crude indeed. Apart from specific places where common
costs may be shared, e.g., in a joint terminal for end to end
carriers, our calculation of the savings to be achieved by a
merger are nebulous. That difficulty renders hazardous the pre-
scription of any stopping point in the application of protectionist
principles. Under a protective tariff, one can at least look at
the price of the foreign product outside the tariff wall to see
how much it is costing consumers to subsidize domestic pro-
ducers. No such ready comparison can be made in the case of
protection achieved by curbing domestic efficiency.
Even more difficult, however, is the attempt to quantify the
sociological values which might be preserved by a policy of pro-
tectionism. And even if some dollar for dollar estimate of costs
and benefits could be calculated, it is not certain that the so-
ciological benefits could actually be achieved in the long run.
Other factors, particularly technological change, might destroy
them even if mergers were banned.
Thus, no calculus can be offered to demonstrate the greater
weight of either side of countervailing contentions. And it is no
answer to say that, when in doubt, do nothing. Inaction may
have just as large an impact as action; the only thing to say for
it is that it saves the expense of the action itself.
Finally, if the decision should be to permit mergers in the
nature of dispersion, it does not necessarily follow that giant
corporations will swallow our entire economy. Over the decades,
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and without much in the way of protection, small business has
shown great survival powers. The vigorous growth of "service
industries" in recent years is often thought to reflect the growing
importance of relatively modest enterprises. The "Mom-Pop"
grocery may be gone, but the television repair man flourishes.

